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The headlines read "Russian Runner Fails EPO Drug Test"'
and "Yegorova and her like must not be able to prosper., 2 Her
competitors called her a drug cheat and threatened to boycott any
race that she was in.3 At the World Championships, she was booed
as she won the 5000 meter race.' So was the punishment meted out
to Olga Yegorova after she was wrongfully accused of failing a test
for performance enhancing drugs.5
Before the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the pundits and the
press decried an Olympic Movement awash in drugs and impotent
or unwilling to go through detoxification.6 Scandals, such as the
1999 Tour de France, were threatening to destroy the Olympic
Movement as it moved into its second century. So the forces were
mustered. The old playbook and the old players were retired. The
International Olympic Committee drafted a new Anti-Doping
Code, the World Anti-Doping Agency was created, and the United
States Anti-Doping Agency was founded. The Olympic Movement
changed the rules of doping control.
The new doping rules and the new vice cop on the beat are
suppose to catch, before they could do their dirty work, the Ben
Johnsons8 of the world. The World Anti-Doping Agency
("WADA") and the United States Anti-Doping Agency
("USADA") also promised to clean up Dodge City without
shooting the piano player in the process. But Olga Yegorova may
feel differently after her brush with the law in the summer of 2001.
She passed all subsequent drug tests and the positive test result that
started her nightmare was eventually retracted.9
1. Amy Shipley, Russian Runner Fails EPO Drug Test, THE WASH. POST,
July 27, 2001, at D7.
2. Sebastian Coe, Yegorova and Her Like Must Not Be Able to Prosper, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), September 2, 2001.
3. See Dick Patrick, lOC's Most Trying Test: Drugs, USA TODAY, August 2,
2001, at 3C.
4. Tom Knight, Yegorova Defiant after Race of Shame, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), August 13, 2001, at 7.
5. See Peter Clark, Athletics: Dope Discrepancy Sets Yegorova Free, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), October 3, 2001, at 23.
6. See John Andrews, Superhuman Heroes, THE ECONOMIST, June 6, 1998, at
S10.
7. See Steve Keating, Ii Pirata Captures Tarnished Tour, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), August 3, 1998, § S, at 1.
8. Ben Johnson was stripped of the 1988 Olympic Gold Medal for the 100
meters after testing positive for a performance enhancing drug. See Andrews,
supra note 6, at 10.
9. See CLARK, supra, note 5, at 23.
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Performance enhancing drugs in all sports, from high schools
to the National Football League, are nothing to joke about. They
lure athletes with promises of gold medals, but all too often leave
athletes with life long health problems, or worse. Drugs in sports is
a serious matter that must be dealt with in a serious manner. But
have the changes made in the wake of the Sydney Olympic
improved the system? Will the Ben Johnsons be stopped without
McCarthy style witch hunts? Will the mistakes that marred Olga
Yegorova's case be cured?
This article examines the pre-Sydney doping control system to
explore its efficiency and fairness. First, a sampling of headline
doping stories focuses the examination. Then, the article explores
post-Sydney changes to determine if the system has been enhanced,
if the system is efficient, and if the system is fair.
A. The Case of Mary Slaney
At the 1996 United States Olympic Track and Field Trials,
Mary Slaney, at age thirty-six, capped a dramatic comeback from
numerous injuries and setbacks by qualifying for the Atlantic
Games in the 5000 meters.10 She also tested positive for test-
osterone, a banned performance-enhancing drug." By qualifying
for the Olympic Games, Mary Slaney added to her claim as the
greatest distance runner in United States history.2 By testing
positive for testosterone, Mary Slaney set in motion a series of
events that would put the system of doping enforcement to one of
its stiffest tests ever.
All Olympic Games qualifiers must be tested for performance
enhancing drugs. 3 Mary Slaney's test showed a ratio of test-
osterone to epitestosterone of greater than six-to-one.14 The United
States of America Track and Field ("USA T&F"), the International
Association of Athletic Federations ("IAAF"), and the Inter-
national Olympic Committee ("IOC") considered Mary Slaney's
10. See Philip Hersh, Slaney is Cleared of Doping Charges, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
17, 1997, § 4, at 1.
11. Id.
12. Although she has never won an Olympic medal, many point to Mary
Slaney's World Championship gold medals in the 1500 and 3000 and her holding of
the American record for every distance from the 800 to 10,000 as evidence to
support the claim that she is the best distance runner in United States history.
13. See Latest Drug Testing Information, at http://www/.usatf.org (last visited
Feb. 26, 2002).




tests result as proof that she took artificial testosterone.'5 Under
USA T&F rules, Slaney should have been afforded a hearing to
determine whether she had committed a doping violation, which
would have resulted in a suspension potentially removing her from
the United States Olympic Team. 6 Under IAAF rules, Slaney
should have been suspended and afforded a hearing. 7 Neither
event occurred and she participated in the Atlanta Olympic Games
six weeks later."
After the Olympic Games, Slaney continued to enjoy her
comeback. At the 1997 Indoor World Championships, she took the
silver medal and a prize of $20,000.19 At this time, no hearing, no
suspension, and no public disclosure of her positive test had
occurred. It was not until May 1997 that news of Slaney's positive
test became public2° and the IAAF suspended her.2' USA T&F
followed the IAAFs lead and suspended Mary on June 10th,
thereby keeping her from competing in the United States
15. See HERSH, supra, note 10. See also, INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF ATHLETICS
FEDERATIONS RULES: PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR DOPING CONTROL 18
(2000), available at http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query?p=IAAF+Procedural%
5c&hc=0&hs=0; INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MEDICAL CODE, att. 1, ch.
II, art. I (c).
16. Under UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg.
10A(D)(3), an athlete has a right to a hearing before any decision on eligibility is
made. UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg.
1OA(D)(3) (2001), available at http://www.usatf.org/about/governance/2001
GovernanceManual.pdf (Updated May 2001). USA T&F must notify the athlete
of the positive test results and the athlete has twenty-eight days to request a
hearing before the Doping Hearing Board. UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD
GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg. 1OA(D)(4), available at http://www.usatf.org/about/
governance/200lGovernanceManual.pdf (updated May 2001).
17. Under IAAF Rule 59(2), the IAAF or the appropriate national governing
body (in Mary Slaney's case, USA T&F) shall suspend an athlete upon the report
of "evidence that a doping offense has taken place." The three stages of a
disciplinary proceeding where a doping offense has occurred under IAAF Rule
59(1) are: (1) suspension, (2) hearing, and (3) ineligibility. Under IAAF Rule
59(3), after a suspension, an athlete has twenty-eight days to request a hearing,
which is to be first conducted by the national governing body. Therefore, under
the IAAF rules, Mary Slaney should have been suspended upon her positive test
and given a hearing to determine her eligibility.
18. At the Olympic Games, Mary Slaney failed to advance from the
preliminary heat to the finals.
19. Steve Herman, IAAF Strips Silver Medal from Slaney (April 27, 1999),
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/athletics/news/1999/0
4/ 27 /slaney-
hearing/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
20. Mary Slaney's positive test was first made public in an article in the NEW
YORK TIMES in May, 1997. USA T&F Clears Slaney, TRACK and FIELD NEWS,
December 1997, at 381.
21. Jill Lieber, Slaney Numb Over Latest Suspension News, USA TODAY, June
12, 1997, at C.
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Championships and preventing her from qualifying for the Outdoor
World Championships." Even though the USA T&F suspended
Slaney in May, USA T&F did not schedule a hearing before its
Doping Panel until September 1997.
Before the panel,' her attorneys argued that the six-to-one
ratio of testosterone to epitestosterone in general, and as applied to
women in particular, was unreliable and not evidence of a doping
violation. Slaney argued that the use of oral contraceptives,
menstruation and alcohol use, individually and collectively, would
cause a ratio greater than six-to-one.24 On September 16th, USA
T&F ruled that the six-to-one standard was unreliable in women
and lifted Slaney's suspension.25 Slaney thought that the matter was
26closed and that she could resume competition. She was wrong.
In January 1998, the IAAF announced that it would not accept
the ruling from USA T&F as conclusive and that it was sending the
matter to its own arbitration proceeding.27 Mary remained eligible
to compete while her hearing was pending, but if the IAAFs
arbitration board ruled against her, the IAAF would suspend her
retroactively.' The IAAF scheduled the hearing for April, 1999 in
Monaco.
At the final hearing, the IAAF was the only party to present
evidence supporting the validity of the six-to-one ratio
presumption. Slaney's attorneys refused to appear before the
IAAF Panel feeling that the IAAF unfairly required athletes to
prove their innocence rather than requiring the IAAF to prove the
athlete's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.29 USA T&F supported
Slaney's decision not to appear.3 ° The IAAF Panel ruled against
Slaney stating that she failed "to establish by clear evidence that an
abnormal T.E. test was attributable to pathological or physiological
22. Id.
23. The Doping Hearing Board was made up of three arbitrators appointed by
the USA T&F. See Jere Longman, U.S. Federation Clears Slaney in Doping Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at 2C.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Once cleared by a national governing body, an athlete is eligible to
compete unless the IAAF determines that the national governing body's decision
was in error. IAAF Rule 59.
27. Arbitration for Slaney, KEEPING TRACK, Feb. 1998, 71.
28. Id.
29. IAAF Finds Slaney Guilty, KEEPING TRACK, May 1999, 86. Mary's





conditions."'" The IAAF Panel retroactively suspended her from
performing for two years and requested that she return all prize
money. Shortly after the IAAF's ruling, Slaney filed suit against
the IAAF in an Indiana Federal District Court." That following
November, the Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds.'
On Appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the District Court.3 5
Mary's case, unfortunately, is not unique. It is a saga of lost
races,36 lost prize money,37 international conflict,38 and public
relations blunders.39
B. The Nandrolone Four
Linford Christie, the 1992 Olympic 100 meter champion, Mark
Richardson, the Commonwealth 400 meter silver medallist, Dougie
Walker, the European 200 meter champion, and Gary Cadogan, a
400 meter hurdler, all British citizens, all tested positive for
nandrolone in out-of-competition tests in1999i0 They were only
31. Id. T-E test stands for the testosterone-epitestosterone test.
32. HERMAN, supra note 19.
33. Id. See Slaney, 244 F.3d at 584.
34. Ron Bellamy, Slaney Races For Fun of It, THE REGISTER-GUARD
(Eugene), June 6, 2000. See Slaney, 244 F.3d at 586.
35. Slaney's complaint raised six state law claims (breach of contract,
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud,
constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation) against the IAAF and USOC,
and a RICO claim against the USOC. The court found the state law claims to raise
issues already decided by the IAAF's arbitration panel, and thereby barred from
re-litigation by the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (New York Convention),
and dismissed the claim against the IAAF. As for the USOC, the Court found that
the TED STEVENS OLYMPIC AND AMATEUR SPORTS ACT, 36 U.S.C. § 220501
(2001), barred state law claims and that the complaint failed to allege a claim
under RICO. Slaney, 244 F.3d 580 at 586-87.
36. Regardless of whether Mary Slaney was guilty of a doping violation, races
were missed. Mary missed the 1997 United States Championships and the
subsequent summer circuit.
37. Mary Slaney, by being suspended for the summer of 1997, missed the
chance to earn appearance fees and prize money.
38. Mary's case pitted the IAAF against the USA T&F and highlighted the
difference between the two organizations' disciplinary procedures and notions of
due process.
39. USA T&F took a big public relations hit as a result of this decision.. First,
it was accused of mishandling Mary's case by delaying the hearing and then by
leaking the news of her positive test before a hearing was held. Second, USA T&F
and the sport itself saw one of its biggest stars accused of doping at a time when
the sport was amidst a drop in public attention.
40. Ducan MacKay, Richardson and Walker Cleared to Race but Olympic
Battle Looms, THE GUARDIAN, July 26, 2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/
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four of 343 athletes that tested positive for nandrolone in 1999.41
Each athlete was suspended because of the positive test, as is the
practice in Europe. In July 2000, shortly before the Sydney
Olympics, the United Kingdom Athletics afforded each athlete a
hearing.' Each athlete was able to explain away the positive test
result, claiming that legally purchased over-the-counter food
supplements caused the positive results. 3  United Kingdom
Athletics lifted the suspensions of all four athletes on the
conclusion that reasonable doubt existed that they deliberately
ingested nandrolone."
Not surprisingly, the IAAF, on its own motion, renewed the
suspension of all four athletes and sent each athlete to IAAF's own
arbitration process.4'5 Before the IAAF's panel, United Kingdom
Athletics submitted the results of a study performed at Aberdeen
University in England that showed that a combination of food
supplements and vigorous exercise could produce positive test
results for nandrolone.46 The IAAF panel found the Aberdeen
study incomplete and thus rejected the finding of United Kingdom
Athletics that the athletes lacked intent to violate the rules.47 All
four athletes were excluded from the Olympics despite domestic
court challenges.4 8
United Kingdom Athletics was disappointed with the IAAFs
ruling. David Moorcroft, United Kingdom Athletics' chief exec-
utive officer, accused the IAAF of not being faithful to the
Article?D,4273,4044278,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
41. Glenn Sheiner, Nandrolone Has Been Found Since 1976-Why All The Fuss
About It Now, CANADIAN ACADEMY OF SPORTS MEDICINE, Oct. 2000,
http://www.casm-acms.org/Committees/Newsletter/Newsletter%20Frames/OctO
text.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).





47. Adrian Lee, I Am Innocent Says Christie as His World Lies in Tatters, THE
EXPRESS, Aug. 22, 2000.
48. Dougie Walker argued before a London High Court that under the
IAAF's rules, the IAAF proceeding was a dispute only between the IAAF and UK
Athletics, not an individual athlete such as Dougie Walker. IAAF rules speak of
the IAAF holding a second hearing when the IAAF believes that the member
NGB, here UK Athletics, has "misdirected" itself-in other words, when the
national governing body has made an incorrect decision. Walker argued that this
gave the IAAF arbitration panel jurisdiction over only United Kingdom Athletics,
in order to correct United Kingdom Athletics. The case was ultimately
unsuccessful. Tom Knight, Walker Wins Permission to Fight IAAF, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 5, 2000, at 35.
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reasonable doubt standard found in the IAAF's own rules.49
Moorcroft requested an investigation of the IAAF ° Interestingly,
six months later, the International Olympic Committee ("IOC")
laboratory in Cologne, Germany, found that sixteen of 100 supple-
ments tested would cause positive test results for nandrolone' Yet,
the IAAF has continued to adhere to the strict liability standard in
the face of challenges from athletes and national governing bodies
like United Kingdom Athletics.
C. Due Process Concerns
Mary Slaney's case and the cases of the Nandrolone Four,
although atypical, are nevertheless sad examples of the Byzantine
and dysfunctional world of anti-doping control before the 2000
Olympic Games. From the athletes' perspective, the cases are
evidence of a system that ignores basic notions of due process by
incorrectly assigning burdens, issues punishment before holding a
hearing and uses biased arbitrators. From the governing bodies'
perspective, the cases are examples of a system that moves too
slowly and contains too many loopholes.
Realizing these criticisms, the Olympic Movement, both
internationally and within the United States, has set out to
restructure and repair its doping control mechanisms. The
following sections focus on the Olympic and international doping
control mechanisms as they existed before the 2000 Sydney
Olympics and on these same processes in the wake of the reforms
instituted after the Sydney Games. In particular, the analysis
focuses attention on the due process afforded to accused athletes in
the pre- and post-Sydney era.
II. The Pre-Sydney Doping Control System
A. The Olympic Movement
The world of international sports has historically been built
around the Olympic Games with the IOC sitting atop a pyramid-
like structure. Although it can be argued that this structure is
49. Tom Knight, Disgrace for British Over Doping Ban, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 22, 2000, at 34.
50. Id.
51. BBC Sport, Supplements May Cause Drug Failures, (Jan. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/sports/hi/english/in-depth/2000/ drugs-in-sports
/newsid1144000/1144299.stm (last visited Feb. 26,2002).
2002]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
eroding, the Olympic Movement is still the blueprint that governs
the distribution of control and power in international sports.
International legitimacy begins with and flows from the Olympic
games, including doping control.
The IOC derives the power to control international sports
from its ability to decide which sports are a part of the Olympics
and which individuals are permitted to participate in the Olympic
Games. 2 Hence, the IOC sets the qualifications that must be met
to be part of the Olympic Movement.
Just below the IOC, the pyramid moves down to the
International Federations ("IFs"). Each IF governs an individual
sport, such as track and field or swimming, and operates only with
the IOC's blessing. 3 Without the IOC's blessing, the IF's sport will
not be part of the Olympic Games. 4 Each IF sets the rules of its
sport, conducts competitions outside of the Olympics, and deter-
mines the qualifications for the Olympics.5 Each IF is comprised of
similar organizations in individual countries referred to as national
governing bodies (NGBs). NGBs sit at the base of the pyramid. 6
Somewhere in the middle of the pyramid are the National Olympic
Committees ("NOCs"). National Olympic Committees control
each country's Olympic Games entries and thereby, during
Olympic years, take control of the NGBs' activity in their
respective countries. 7 In some countries, particularly the United
States, NOCs exercise control over NGBs during non-Olympic
years." In such systems, NGBs have three masters: IFs, the IOC,
and NOCs.
The hierarchy of power and control in doping control generally
follows the pyramid structure described above: with a few nuances
in the power dynamics. The IOC, with its control of the Olympic
52. See OLYMPIC CHARTER art. 45, available at http://www.olympic.org/UK/
organization/missions/charter uk-asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); JAMES A.R.
NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 26 (1988).
53. See OLYMPIC CHARTER art. 29, available at http://www.olympic.org/UK/
organization/missions/charter_uk-asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); NAFZIGER, supra
note 52, at 28.
54. OLYMPIC CHARTER art. 29, available at http://www.olympic.org/UK/
organization/missions/charter uk-asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); NAFZIGER, supra
note 52, at 28.
55. NAFZIGER, supra note 52, at 27-28.
56. See, IAAF CONST. Rule 4, available at http://www.iaaf.org/insidelAAF/
index.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
57. See OLYMPIC CHARTER art. 31, available at http://www.olympic.org/UK/
organization/missions/charter uk-asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); NAFZIGER, supra
note 52, at 29-30.
58. See 36 U.S.C. § 220501 (2001).
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Games, sets the global agenda. The IOC determines the testing
procedure and banned substances for the Games, 9 and thereby
establishes a baseline or international norm for testing prohibited
substances. Each IF has the authority to establish its own list of
banned substances and testing procedures, including when testing
will occur.6°  NGBs and NOCs are charged with "first line"
responsibility for testing and enforcing the rules established by the
IOC and IFs.61 However, when doping enforcement moves from
the international plane to the domestic plane of NGBs and NOCs,
domestic laws and practices can affect the dynamics of enforcement
and cooperation between the IOC and IF on one side and NGBs
and NOCs on the other side.
The history of doping control has largely been a story of a
prospective jurisdictional struggle between the IOC, the IFs and the
NGBs. For the most part, the IOC has prevailed in this struggle,
and the IFs have prevailed over the NGBs. But those victories
have not always been easily won. For example, when the IOC
asked that every IF adopt the new IOC Anti-Doping Code, the
Federation Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA")
balked at some of the provisions in the Code and felt that it had the
independence to go its own way.62 Since FIFA has the revenue and
popularity of the Soccer World Cup, it may no longer need the
Olympic Games and Olympic Movement to survive and flourish.
Although it ultimately relented, FIFA is an example of the IOC's
weakening position at the top of the international sports pyramid.
The discussion and analysis that follows explores the dynamics of
the power relationships within the Olympic Movement regarding
doping control.
B. Doping Enforcement in the United States
The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act ("ASA")
of 1978 governs doping enforcement by the United States NGBs
59. See INT'L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ANTI-DOPING CODE, II, art. 2, available at
http://www.ijf.org/commission/sp-do.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
60. See, IAAF CONST. Rule 58, 59, and 60, available at http://www.iaaf.org
/inside IAAF/index.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
61. See, UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg. 9, 10,
available at http://www.usatf.org/about/governance/2001/Governance Operating
.pdf.
62. Doping Summit Seems Hard to Meet Goal, THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,




and the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC").63 Under the
ASA, Congress created an administrative structure and placed the
USOC at the top. The USOC became responsible for coordinating
United States' participation in international competitions, such as
the Olympics and Pan Am Games, with the National Governing
Bodies for individual sports, such as swimming, reporting to the
USOC. Congress intended for this structure to provide order to the
disorganized and contentious relationship between sports organ-
izations in the United States.6' For example, prior to the ASA, the
Amateur Athletic Union and the Athletic Congress, struggled for
control of track and field in the United States. After the ASA, the
USOC had the authority and responsibility to recognize only one
NGB per sport.
Under the ASA, Congress created a doping control and
adjudication process that begins with the NGBs, moves to the
USOC, and finishes with an appeal to the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"). This process is designed for "swift
resolution of conflicts" that "protect the opportunity of any athlete
... to participate in Amateur Athletic Competition. '  However,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the ASA does not
create a right to compete.
67
When an athlete is accused of a doping violation, the athlete
must complete the NGB's internal process.6 Butch Reynolds was
one of the first to use the new court system in his dispute with the
IAAF and The Athletic Congress ("TAC") 69. However, Reynolds'
case was dismissed because he failed to complete the existing TAC
appeal process.7" Within an NGB, there can exist several hearing or
arbitration steps.7 In the event of a negative ruling from the
National Board, an athlete may appeal to the Board of Directors.
In USA T&F, a three-person panel first hears the athlete's
63. 36 U.S.C. § 220501 (2001).
64. NAFZIGER, supra note 52, at 178-9.
65. 36 U.S.C. § 220521(a) (2001).
66. 36 U.S.C. § 220509 (2001).
67. Michels v. U.S.O.C., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984).
68. Reynolds v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., No. C-2-91-0003, 1991 WL
179760 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 19, 1991).
69. The TAC was later renamed United States of America Track and Field.
70. Reynolds, 1991 WL 179760.
71. See Foschi v. United States Swimming, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 232, 235
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
72- Id. at 236.
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challenge.73 Then, in the case of a guilty finding, the athlete may
appeal to the Doping Appeals Board.74
If an athlete is dissatisfied with the final decision of an NGB,
the ASA and the Constitution of the USOC provide for an appeal
to the USOC.7" The procedure before the USOC begins with a
written complaint from the athlete.76 The USOC then has thirty
days to determine if the athlete has exhausted all remedies within
the NGB.77 Having exhausted all NGB remedies, the athlete is then
entitled to a hearing before the USOC to determine if the NGB's
process complied with all USOC constitutional requirements.
7 8
Both parties may present written and oral evidence and may cross-
examine witnesses at the hearing.79 The burden of proof is on the
athlete to prove the NGB's procedures to be in violation of the
USOC's Constitution.8° After the close of the athlete's case, the
NGB may move for dismissal of the complaint, and failing in that
motion, the NGB may present its own evidence.8'
If the athlete is dissatisfied with the USOC's decision, the
athlete has thirty days to appeal to the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA")."' Under the authority of the AAA, the
athlete may argue to a three-person panel that the procedure below
was improper. 3 The AAA's rules for commercial arbitration are
used and the ASA requires the hearings to be open to the public.'
However, the process is informal: the rules of evidence do not
apply and additional evidence, not presented below, may be
submitted.85 If a situation is determined to be an emergency, an
73. UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg.
1OA(D)(4).
74. Id. 1OA(E)(2)(n).
75. 36 U.S.C. § 220527 (2001).
76. Id. § 220527(a).
77. Id. § 220527(b).
78. Id. § 220527(c).





82. 36 U.S.C. § 220529 (2001).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMM. CONST., art. VIII, 4(c) (2001),
http://www.usolympicteam.comlabout-us/documents/constitutionl0270l.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2002).
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expedited forty-eight hour process is available.' Decisions of the
AAA are final and binding on all parties.'
C USA T&F Hearing Process
USA T&F Regulation 10 governs the disciplinary process of
athletes who test positive for performance enhancing substances.'
The Regulation 10 process is similar to the United States criminal
process in that both require a burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and provide the right of cross-examination. Nevertheless,
Regulation 10 is also similar to a United States civil administrative
proceeding-with aspects of strict liability and confidentiality.
The Regulation 10. process begins when an athlete's "A-
sample" tests positive for a prohibited substance.89 The athlete is
notified and given the opportunity to request that his or her "B-
sample" be tested.' Upon a positive B-sample, the athlete may
request a hearing before the Doping Hearing Board ("DHB").
91
The athlete whose B-sample tested positive may continue to
compete during the period between the news of the positive A-
sample result and the end of the hearing process.' This right to
compete is a protection created by the ASA and repeated in
Regulation 10.' However, any suspension resulting from the
process can, and is, likely to be applied retroactively.94 After
notification of a positive B-sample result, the athlete has twenty-
eight days to request a hearing with the hearing normally held at
the next monthly meeting of the DHB. 95 It is likely that the athlete
86. See UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMM. CONST., art. IX, 2 (2001),
http://www.usolympicteam.com/about-us/documents/constitutionl02701.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2002).
87. 36 U.S.C. § 220529 (2001).
88. See UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg. 10
(2000), available at http://www.usatf.org/about/governance/2001Governance
Manual.pdf (Updated May 2001).
89. Id. Reg. 1OA(D)(1).
90. Id. Reg. 1OA(D)(2).
91. See id. Reg. 1OA(D)(3).
92. See id.
93. See 36 U.S.C. § 220521 (2001).
94. UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg.
1OA(D)(8) (2001), available at http://www.usatf.org/about/governance/2001
GovernanceManual.pdf (Updated May 2001).
95. UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg.
1OA(D)(4) (2001), available at http://www.usatf.orgabout/governance/2001
GovernanceManual.pdf (Updated May 2001).
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will have to wait six to eight weeks for a hearing. Importantly, the
athlete may not be suspended before being afforded a hearing.96
The DHB is comprised of three persons randomly selected
from a list, created by various USA T&F committees' The Board
always includes one active athlete.98 The athlete and the represent-
ative of USA T&F, acting as a prosecutor and called a "presenter of
evidence," 99 may challenge panel members on the basis of bias and
use two preemptory challenges.00 The hearings are closed to the
public, may be conducted by telephone, and are recorded.0'9
Before a hearing is held, the Chair of the panel coordinates the
discovery requests of the athlete."° During the hearing, an attorney
may represent the athlete and may present evidence, call witnesses
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.'3 The USA T&F prosecutor
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prohibited substance
was found in the athlete's body fluids.1 ° However, the athlete may
not claim as an affirmative defense that (1) the substance was taken
without knowledge, (2) the substance was given by another, (3) the
substance was prescribed by a doctor, or (4) the substance did not
enhance performance."
The DHB must render a decision within forty-eight hours of
the hearing and issue a written opinion, including findings and
conclusions, within fifteen days of the hearing. °" If an athlete is
"found to have committed a doping offense," the athlete is declared
ineligible, and the applicable penalty is imposed.' ° Within twelve
days of receiving the written opinion of the DHB, an athlete may
appeal to the Drug Appeals Board ("DAB"). ° The DAB is
comprised of three persons, one of whom is an active athlete.
Before the DAB, the athlete has the burden of showing that
the DHB decision was clearly erroneous. Although both parties
may submit written briefs, the hearing is conducted by telephone,
96. See id. Reg. 1OA(D)(3).
97. See id. Reg. 11j)(2).
98. See id.
99. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(2)(e).
100. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(2)(b)
101. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(2)(c).
102. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(2)(a).
103. Id. Reg. 10A(D)(7).
104. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(2)(e).
105. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(2)(f).
106. Id. Reg. 10A(E)(2)(k).
107. Id. Reg. 1OA(D)(8).
108. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(1).
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and no new evidence may be submitted unless unavailable at the
first hearing before the DHB.'O°
D. International Federation Dispute Resolution
Dispute resolution between an individual athlete and an IF
usually occurs only after proceedings between the athlete and the
appropriate NGB have taken place. Notwithstanding, when the IF
conducts the investigation or the testing, the IF process can occur
prior to the proceedings between the athlete and the appropriate
NGB. IF proceedings are generally similar to NGB proceedings.
The marked and confounding difference between IF and NGB
proceedings is the power of the IF to suspend an athlete prior to
any hearing. NGBs are specifically forbidden from suspending an
athlete prior to a hearing by the ASA."0
The rules of two representative IFs, The International
Association of Athletic Federations ("IAAF") and the Federation
Internationale de Natation ("FINA"), start with the power of the
IF to review the decisions of member NGBs on the IF's own
motion."' Since NGBs are uniformly required to follow and
implement IF rules, the IF's power to review allows the IF to
correct the NGB for abusing IF rules."' The power to review NGB
decisions is imperative since the IF has the power to suspend an
athlete prior to any IF hearing."3 The IF's power to suspend an
athlete prior to a hearing creates an urgency to the process and
ensures that the athlete will attend the process with all haste. This
incentive is often a catalyst to the process. However, this incentive
can also wrongfully prolong the harm that an athlete will ultimately
receive. Therefore, the speed of the dispute process becomes
critical.
Both the IAAF and FINA call for the dispute to be settled by
an IF-created arbitration panel."' A three-person panel, drawn
from a list of six arbitrators appointed by the IF, hears the
109. Id. Reg. 1OA(E)(3).
110. See 36 U.S.C. § 220521 (2001).
111. See FINA CONST. § 19.7, available at http://www.fina.org/const.html; IAAF
CONST. Rule 21(3)(ii), available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsideIAAF/Handbook/
handbook2002/IAAF%2OConstitution.pdf.
112. See, IAAF CONST. Rule 20(2)(c), available at http://www.iaaf.org/Inside
IAAF/Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF% 2OConstitution.pdf.
113. Id. Rule 59(2); FINA Reg. DC 8.3.5.
114. IAAF CONST. Rule 21(1), available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsideIAAF/
Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%20Constitution.pdf.; FINA Rule C 19.6.
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dispute."' The procedural details of the hearing vary between IFs.
For example, the IAAF rules place the burden of proof on the
IAAF to prove that a doping offense occurred."6 In contrast, FINA
places the burden of challenging the testing procedures on the
athlete.117 Further, the IAAF rules are more detailed on matters
such as the presentation of evidence,"' where FINA's rules are
vague on the procedure for the hearing.1 '9 This vagueness creates a
greater possibility of arbitrary decisions. For example, the IAAF's
rules allow the arbitrators to withhold the reasons for their decision
from the athlete.2° Some IFs allow their decisions to be appealed to
the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS").
21
E. International Federation Arbitration History
In high profile cases, IF arbitration has generally been avoided.
Much of this can be attributed to the view that IF arbitration lacks
due process and is generally nothing more than a rubber stamp for
previous IF decisions. 2 The fact that the arbitrators are appointed
by the IF and the fact that the burden often seems to rest on the
athlete to prove his or her innocence lends support to this view.
Butch Reynolds' arbitration hearing before an IAAF panel is often
cited as an example of lack of fairness in such hearings. After two
days of proceedings before the IAAF panel, the arbitrators took
only two hours to reach their decision against Reynolds."z As a
result, athletes and their lawyers have chosen other routes to
115. FINA Rule 19.2 and 19.6; IAAF CONST. Rule 22(1) and 22(7), available at
http://www.iaaf.org/InsideIAAF/Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%2OConstitution
.pdf.
116. IAAF CONST. Rule 59(6), available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsidelAAF/
Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%20Constitution.pdf.
117. FINA Rule DC 8.1.
118. IAAF CONST. Rule 23, available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsideIAAF
Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%20Constitution.pdf.
119. FINA Rule 19 covers the operation of the Doping Panel. Both FINA Rule
19 and FINA Doping Rule DC 8, entitled Procedures, do not speak to the
procedure of its arbitration.
120. IAAF CONST. Rule 23(8), available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsidelAAF/
Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%2OConstitution.pdf.
121. FINA Rule 10.8.3. See Bert Roughton, Jr., Atlanta 1998 Arbitration Plan
OK'd in Effort to Stem Court Fights, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONST., June 23,
1994, at c8.
122. Ronald Rowan, Legal Issues and the Olympics, Speech Before the
Association of American Law Schools 1996 Annual Meeting of the Section of Law
and Sports (Jan. 6, 1996), 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 395,410 (1996).
123. David Mack, Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation: The
Need for an Independent Tribunal in International Athletic Disputes, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L. L. 653, 674 (1995).
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overturn IF suspensions. In a number of cases, the dispute boils
down to a clash between an NGB or domestic arbitration decision
clearing an athlete and an IF's refusal to accept the NGB or
arbitration decision .
Butch Reynold's case was the first to bring forth the clash
between domestic decisions clearing athletes and IF decisions
refusing to adopt the clearing. After testing positive, Reynolds
obtained a decision from the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") and later from the TAC (later USA T&F) clearing him
of the doping charge." Nevertheless, the IAAF refused to honor
those decisions, held its own arbitration hearing, and continued
Reynolds' suspensionY 6 Like Reynolds, Swimmer Jessica Foschi
was cleared of doping charges by an AAA decision, only to have
her IF (FINA) refuse to accept the decision and continue her
suspension even though it had not held a hearing.1 27 Hurdler
Stephon Flenoy also received an AAA decision setting aside his
doping charge only to have the IAAF refuse to accept the decision
and continue his suspension.'" And finally, Mary Slaney was
cleared of doping charges by USA T&F, only to have the IAAF
rule otherwise. 29
F. The Court of Arbitration for Sport
In an effort to deal with an increasing number of international
disputes in the sporting world, the IOC created the Court of
Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") in 1983. The CAS is located in
Switzerland. Its initial structure and operating rules gave it the
appearance of being no more than an extension of the sports world
governing structure and therefore unlikely to rule against that
structure.13 ° Hence, the court was rarely used. Consequently, the
124. For example, during the summer of 2000 shortly before the Olympic
Games, the British NGB for track and field cleared athletes of doping charges,
only to have the IAAF impose sanctions for doping. See supra text at II.B.
125. Reynolds v. IAAF, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (S.D. Ohio, 1992), rev'd 23
F.3d 1110 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994).
126. Julie Cart, Panel Refuses to Lift Ban on Record-Holder Reynolds, L.A.
TIMES, May 12, 1992, at c.3.
127. International Swimming Officials Ban Foschi for Two Years, REUTERS,
June 24, 1996.
128. IAAF Says U.S. Hurdler Still Barred From Meet, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 14, 1997, at 5B.
129. See supra text at I.A..
130. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration of International Sports Disputes, 9 ARB.
INT'L at 359, 364 (1993).
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structure and rules of CAS were reworked in 1993 to increase the
court's independence. 3
1. Pre 1993-The membership of the panel of arbitrators
was among the features of the first incarnation of CAS that created
an appearance of bias. Of the panel of sixty arbitrators available to
hear disputes, the IOC appointed fifteen, the Association of
National Olympic Committees appointed fifteen, the IFs appointed
fifteen, and the President of the IOC appointed fifteen from outside
the IOC, NOCs, and IFs. 32 All sixty arbitrators were to have legal
training and be familiar with the ways of sport.'33 To athletes, the
make-up of this panel looked a lot like the people accusing them of
wrongdoing. In addition to the panel membership, IOC funded the
CAS entirely and the CAS was based in the IOC's headquarters in
Lausanne.' 3'
2. The New CAS-In 1993, the IOC, IFs, and NOCs
restructured CAS to increase its independence. Foremost in this
effort was the creation of the International Council of Arbitration
for Sport ("ICAS") to administer and operate the CAS. The IWAS
is to be a buffer between the sports establishment and the
arbitration process. Governed by a twenty-member council, the
ICAS is responsible for adopting and amending the operating rules
of the CAS (called the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration),
appointing CAS arbitrators, deciding challenges to arbitrators and
setting the CAS budget.' However, the Council's make-up and
funding remain closely tied to the IOC and the IFs. The IOC, IFs,
and NOCs appoint twelve Council members who then select the
remaining eight Council members.'36
The Code of Sports-Related Arbitration specifically empowers
the CAS to hear appeals from IF decisions in "doping-related
disputes.' ' 137  The appeals are heard by a separate Appeals
Arbitration Division.' 38 An appeal from an IF doping decision,
however, will not be an appeal in the true sense. The Appeals
Arbitration Division will hear the case de novo3 9 using the
substantive rules of the iF and the law agreed to by the parties, or
131. C.A.S. Compilation, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, at 40 (1993).
132. STATUTE OF THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, art. VII.
133. Id. art. VI.
134. NAFZIGER, supra note 52 at 36.
135. CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION § 6.
136. Id. § 4.
137. Id. § 20.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 57.
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in the absence of an agreement, the law of the home of the IF.'4 No
standards of review or burdens, other than those found in the IF's
rules, are to be applied in the CAS.
A panel of three arbitrators hears the appeal: one arbitrator
selected from the CAS list by the respondent, one by the applicant,
and the third (the President of the Panel) appointed by the
President of the Appeal Division of the GAS. '4 The hearing
process is then, presumably, conducted according to the IF's
procedural rules.
However, the use of the IF's procedural rules is uncertain
because the portion of the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration that
governs the appeals process (Special Provisions Applicable to the
Appeal Arbitration Proceedings) contains no rules setting out the
hearing process. Further, the Special Provisions Applicable to the
Appeal Arbitration Proceeding is also void of any provision
allowing for further discovery or presentation of witnesses. This
leads to the conclusion that appellants are limited to the evidence
presented before the IF. Finally, the decision of the panel is by
majority vote, or failing a majority, by the president of the panel
alone.'42 All decisions are to include a brief statement of reasons
and made public unless the parties agree to keep the decision
confidential.'43
Between 1983 and 1996, CAS decided relatively few doping
appeals. Yet, some doctrines and practices have emerged from the
existing decisions that will help in understanding the tendencies of
the CAS process. One of the important procedural aspects of the
CAS involves the law to be applied in appeal cases. Although the
CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration specifies that the
substantive law of an appeal will be the IF's rules and the law
agreed to by the parties, CAS panels have resorted to general
principles of law and concepts of natural justice on several
occasions.'" It is presumed that the use of these principles and
concepts, is not tied to the agreed law or law of the IF's state of
domicile because the court does not cite authority for its decisions.
The CAS, by freely using general, non-state specific legal doctrine,
is staking out the prerogative to develop its own jurisprudence and
independence.
140. Id. § 58.
141. Id. R. 48, 53-54.
142. CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION R. 59.
143. Id.
144. 1991 C.A.S. No. 56; 1994 C.A.S. No. 129.
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The wisdom of a certain degree of independence for CAS is
open to debate. However, in light of the CAS procedural rule that
applies either the law agreed to by the parties or, if no agreement,
the law of the IF's state of domicile,' this independence could
serve to protect athlete's interests. It is quite logical to conclude
that an IF will not agree to apply a body of law over the laws of the
IF's domicile if that body of law is more protective of an athlete's
interests. As evidenced, the substantive law applied by CAS will
always be the least favorable to the athlete. The use of general
principles of law may help correct that imbalance.
The second important procedural practice of the CAS is
generally to hear appeals de novo. That is, a panel reconsiders a
presentation of the facts and argument on the law without any
presumptions and without a specified standard of review.
146
Although the parties may presumably enter new evidence into the
record, that evidence might not have been discoverable before the
initial IF hearing.1
47
The CAS has stood firmly behind the strict liability doctrine
for positive doping results regardless of the cause of the doping.
Even if the positive result was caused by accident or a third person,
the strict liability doctrine forces a finding of "liability.' ' 149 Then,
after liability has been established, the guilt of the athlete is
determined to set the appropriate penalty. This bifurcated process
is used almost regardless of the IF rules being applied.5
In the liability phase of the analysis, the only means of avoiding
a finding of liability is to prove the test results unreliable, usually by
showing a flaw in the process."' The right of the athlete to rebut a
finding of liability in this way rests on a doctrine of general
principle of law.52 Then, in the penalty analysis, the athlete's fault
or culpability becomes relevant. It is at this stage that the CAS
considered the intent of the athlete to enhance his or her
performance. Penalties have been regularly reduced when the drug
was taken unknowingly or taken out of a medical necessity.53 The
145. CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION R. 58, available at http://www.
tas-cas.org/english/code/textes/code.pdf.
146. 1996 C.A.S. No. 149.
147. Id.
148. 1991 C.A.S. No. 55; 1995 C.A.S. No. 141.
149. 1995 C.A.S. No. 141.
150. 1995 C.A.S. No. 141; 1995 C.A.S. No. 150.
151. 1991 C.A.S. No. 56; 1992 C.A.S. No. 63.
152. Id.
153. 1992 C.A.S. No. 63; 1994 C.A.S. No. 129; 1995 C.A.S. No. 141.
20021
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
CAS panels have often employed the doctrine of proportionality" 4
and equitable principles of natural justice in the penalty phase as
well. "5
The CAS's strict liability standard has withstood attacks based
on due process and equal protection grounds.'5 6 However, in at
least one instance in the penalty analysis, the CAS has declined to
follow the IF's application of a mandatory two year suspension.'
Due process attacks on IF's decision process have been routinely
rejected.'5 8 The CAS has declared that the availability of an appeal
to the CAS remedies any due process imperfections in the IF's
procedures. 5 9
III. Doping Control and Due Process
A. What Process is Due?
Now that the Olympic Movement's doping control process has
been reviewed, the next step is to examine just how much due
process the doping control process affords, and, as an alternative
dispute system, how efficiently the process operates. I have chosen
the dual criteria of due process and efficiency to judge the doping
control process to examine whether the system protects the rights
of the accused while at the same time deciding cases in a manner
that best serves the greater interests of the Olympic Movement.
To evaluate the procedural due process of the doping control
system, I will use United States standards. Although much of the
international conflict over doping control is the result of a clash
between United States common law notions of due process on the
one side and civil law notions of due process on the other side,
United States standards of procedural due process offer the most
protection to an accused athlete. If the doping control process can
afford an athlete extensive protections without compromising
efficiency, its credibility and effectiveness will be enhanced.
Therefore, the procedural due process of the doping control system
will be measured against the standards of: (1) the ASA, (2) civil
and administrative proceedings, and (3) criminal proceedings.
These three standards offer a progressively greater amount of
154. 1995 C.A.S. No. 141.
155. 1994 C.A.S. No. 129.
156. 1994 C.A.S. No. 129; 1995 C.A.S. No. 122.
157. 1995 C.A.S. No. 141.




protection for the athlete andtherefore allow us to judge where the
doping control process falls in the continuum of due process
protections.
Of course, whether the Olympic Movement's doping control
process must afford an athlete any procedural protections under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
requires an analysis of whether and to what extent an adverse
governmental decision would deprive the athlete of a liberty or
property interest.' 6° Although it is arguable whether government
actors are at work in doping control,16' for purposes of this
discussion it will be assumed that the full constraints of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment apply for the purposes of testing the
Olympic Movement's doping control procedures. In any event, to
have full legitimacy and credibility and to satisfy notions of
fundamental fairness, the Olympic Movement's doping control
process should possess a high level of procedural due process
protection, whether or not Constitutional protections apply. But,
before proceeding to examine the particular procedures of the
Olympic Movement's doping control process, an analysis of the
amount of procedural protection that must be afforded under the
Constitution will help to illuminate the interests at stake.
The United States Supreme Court has developed a three-factor
analysis for determining the specific dictates of due process in a
particular setting: (1) identify the private interest that will be
affected, (2) determine the risk of an erroneous deprivation using
the existing procedures and the probative value of additional
procedures, and (3) detail the government's interest, including fiscal
and administrative burdens. For purposes of this argument, the
Olympic Movement's interest will replace the government's
interest. The risk of an erroneous deprivation will be examined in
the second half of this piece.
B. The Interest of the Athlete
The quantum of the private interest an athlete possesses to
engage in his craft hinges on whether that interest is characterized
as a privilege or a right. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that there is no "right to compete" under the ASA. 63
160. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
161. See infra note 306. Also, through the AMATEUR SPORTS AcT, Congress
has created a regulatory agency for the Olympic Movement in the United States.
162. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
163. See Michels v. U.S.O.C., 741 F.2d 155,157 (7th Cir. 1984).
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However, German courts have found a limited right to compete as
contained in the right to work.16' If we are to err on the side of
protecting athletes, we must move toward granting athletes a right
to compete.
By granting athletes at least a limited right to compete, we
recognize the reality that Olympic caliber athletes now earn a living
and make a career of their sport.16 ' To argue that Olympic athletes
do not have the same job and career interests in participating in
their sports as accountants, doctors, or lawyers have in working in
their professions devalues the years of preparation Olympic
athletes have invested. Every national and international level
athlete has chosen sports as a career. Olympic level performance
demands professional level commitment: it is now a full time job.
The private interest involved is a job, with all of its attendant
aspects. In some sense, it is a property interest. But, by the nature
of the accusations involved, these private interests also include
aspects of liberty interests. An athlete accused of taking a
performance-enhancing drug has been accused of an immoral act,
and in some cases, a crime. Such an accusation can harm the
athlete in a way that being fired from a job cannot.1" The athlete's
reputation has been called into question. Thus, the athlete's private
interest is that of career and reputation.
C. The Olympic Movement's Interest
The countervailing interests of the Olympic Movement, as
declared by its officials, can perhaps be divided into three
categories: (1) the costs and administrative burdens, (2) the public
image and business costs, and (3) the interests of other athletes.
The costs and administrative burdens of a particular procedural
step or protection involves a rather fact-specific analysis and will be
saved for the later analysis of individual procedures.
The use of performance enhancing drugs by athletes damages
the public image and business interests of the Olympic
164. Get IAAF to pay Krabbe Compensation, BBC SPORT, June 27, 2001, at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/sport/hi/english/athletics/newsid_1410000/1410443.stm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
165. See NAFZIGER, supra note 52, at 140. Recognizing Olympic athletes as full
time professionals is not universally accepted and explains the attitude of some
sport officials who still hold the romantic view of the part-time gentleman athlete.
See id. at 139.
166. Not only does the athlete miss competitions, he can lose endorsements and




Movement.'67 This interest, however, is irrelevant in the due
process analysis. The due process analysis applies to the effect of
adjudicative procedures. The methods for dealing with the
Olympic Movement's public image problem are education and a
thorough, comprehensive and fair testing system.
The interest of other athletes is the interest in fair competition
free from the influence of performance-enhancing drugs. This
again is a false interest to the due process analysis. An efficient
testing and adjudication process that detects guilty parties in a
timely fashion protects the interests of innocent athletes. More
frequent and more out-of-competition testing is the best way to
serve that interest.
D. Doping Control Systems
1. The Amateur Sports Act-The Amature Sports Act
("ASA") governs the operation of the United States Olympic
Movement's entities. Section 220522(a)(8) requires that each
National Governing Body ("NGB") provide "fair notice and
opportunity for a hearing before declaring" an athlete ineligible.
The USOC has interpreted the due process requirement to at least
require the following elements:
(1) Notice, in writing, of the specific charges and possible
consequences.
(2) Reasonable time to prepare for a defense.
(3) Advance notice of the identity of adverse witnesses.
(4) Right to be assisted by counsel.
(5) Right to hold the hearing at a time and place practicable
to the accused.
(6) A disinterested and impartial fact finder.
(7) Right to call witnesses and present oral and written
evidence and argument.
(8) Right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(9) A record of the hearing.
(10) A minimum burden of proof on the NGB of
preponderance of the evidence.
(11) A timely, reasoned, written decision based solely on the
evidence of record.
167. This cost would appear in lost interest by spectators and sponsors. But it
can also be argued that when performance enhancing drugs bring greater athletic




(12) Notice of and right of appeal."6
2. United States Doping Control-Because the ASA has
been in existence for almost thirty years in the United States, the
Olympic Movement's codified doping control system has few
provisions that run afoul of ASA due process requirements.
However, there are due process concerns in the administration of
the system.69 Two aspects of United States NGB doping control
procedure may violate the ASA. First, because the hearing panels
often contain NGB members, or even active athletes, it can be said
that the fact finder is not disinterested and impartial.17° Second, as
Mary Slaney argued, some presumptions contained in the list of
banned substances, specifically the testosterone to epitestosterone
ratio, could shift the burden to the athlete, relieving the burden on
the NGB, and reducing the burden of proof to a preponderance of
the evidence.
3. International Federation Doping Control-Assuming that
the ASA has complete extraterritorial application, the Olympic
Movement's doping control outside the United States would run
afoul of the ASA. When IFs are involved in doping enforcement,
the most visible and dramatic violation of the ASA is the practice
of suspending an athlete from competition before a hearing can be
held. 7' Then, as the IF process gets started, the ASA may be
violated because the hearing is held outside the United States at a
location that is impractical and expensive for the athlete to attend .
Discovery is also limited or forbidden. Once a hearing has begun,
the hearing panel is often comprised of IF officials who are neither
disinterested nor impartial.1 73 During the presentation of the case,
the burden is often placed on the athlete to prove his innocence."7
168. See Presentation Ronald Rowan to the Meeting of the House of Delegates
of the United States Olympic Committee, April 7, 1984.
169. For example, the delay between testing and a hearing in some cases could
be a violation of the requirement of a timely hearing.
170. See UNITED STATES TRACK AND FIELD GOVERNANCE MANUAL Reg.
10A(E)(2) (2000), available at http://www.usatf.org/about/governance/2001
GovernanceManual.pdf (Updated May 2001). Although the athlete may challenge
the independence of panel members, all panel members, including replacements,
must come from a list created by the NGB.
171. See IAAF CONST. Rule 59(2), available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsideIAAF
/Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%20Constitution.pdf; FINA Reg. DC 8.3.
172. Most IFs are based in Europe and hold their hearings there. Such a
location could make the hearing impracticable for the athlete to attend.
173. For example, the IAAF draws its hearing panel of three from a list of six.
See IAAF CONST. Rule 22(1) and 22(7), available at http://www.iaaf.org/
InsideIAAF/Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF% 2OConstitution.pdf.
174. FINA rules require the athlete to prove that he did not commit a doping
violation. FINA Rule DC 8.1.
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Then, at the conclusion of the hearing, the IF does not need to
support its conclusion with a written and reasoned opinion .' The
IF's decision can be entirely arbitrary.
In appealing an IFs ruling to the CAS, some of the due process
violations that occurred during the IF process are repeated by the
CAS. The due process violations continue because the CAS panel
uses the IF's rules. 6 For example, the same presumptions and
burdens are applicable before the CAS. Additionally, the CAS
generally hears cases in Switzerland, which is not travel friendly.
Finally, the list of potential hearing panel members contains many
members who are connected to the Olympic Movement bureauc-
racy,177 and therefore, potentially biased.
E. Comparing Standards of Due Process
1. Civil Due Process-In a civil penalty setting, the
procedural due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments appear quite similar to the protections afforded by
the ASA. In fact, the protections are so similar that it would not be
a surprise to learn that the ASA was written with a full appreciation
of the Goldberg v. Kelly decision in mind.178 If the civil due process
protections exceed those of the ASA in any respect, it would be in
the emphasis on the right to a meaningful hearing that includes the
right to make an oral presentation and to confront adverse
witnesses. 179  Therefore, the application of civil due process
protections to the Olympic Movement's doping control process
(domestically and internationally) would be very similar to that set
forth in the ASA. On the point of an oral presentation and
confrontation of adverse witnesses, the NGB's use of telecon-
ferences to hear cases could frustrate the right to confront adverse
witnesses and make effective oral presentations. '80
175. See IAAF CONST. Rule 23(8), available at http://www.iaaf.org/InsidelAAF
/Handbook/handbook2002/IAAF%20Constitution.pdf.
176. CODE OFSPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION § 58.
177. CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION R. 48, 53-54.
178. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that receipt of welfare
benefits constituted a protected entitlement interest that could not be deprived
without a pre-termination evidentiary hearing).
179. See id. at 254.
180. A fully effective oral presentation involves give and take between the
advocate and the decision maker, including visual signals, subtle and overt. Also, a
full confrontation between the accused and an adverse witness includes visual
signals and responses, important to the evaluation of credibility by the decision
maker. Teleconference hearings eliminate these aspects of the oral presentation.
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The right to a meaningful hearing could also be violated when
an IF, on its own motion, holds its own second hearing after an
NBG has cleared an athlete of doping charges. If an IF can hold its
own hearing, regardless of the results from a hearing conducted by
the NGB, then the NGB's hearing is rendered meaningless.
2. Criminal Due Process-The heightened procedural due
process protections provided in criminal settings is more a matter of
the depth of the protections rather than the breadth of protections.
The basic procedural protections are the same such as, notice of the
charge, a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, an unbiased
decision maker and no prejudicial delay in the hearing process."'
The fundamental difference is the depth to which those rights are
protected. For example, the right of a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense in a criminal setting includes the right
to be provided with counsel at the state's expense.
With the depth of protection as the objective, a challenged
procedure, or the absence of a procedure, is examined by using a
two-step process. First, the procedure is examined to determine if
it conflicts with the basic adversarial prerequisites of the American
criminal justice process. Second, if there is a conflict, the process is
examined to determine if it deprives the defendant of fundamental
fairness.'
Application of the standard criminal due process protections to
the Olympic Movement's doping control process would forbid
several common practices. Notably, an IF would violate the
prohibition against double jeopardy if it recharged and retried an
athlete after an NGB has cleared the athlete.'83 Second, the
presumptions and burden-shifting that are often used would run
afoul of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Any presumption, such as the testosterone to epitestosterone
presumption used in Mary Slaney's case, would likely be found
impermissible. Third, NGBs and IFs would be forced to allow
181. JEROLD H. ISREAL ET AL., HORNBOOK ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 85 (3d
ed., West, 2000).
182. Id.
183. The double jeopardy doctrine would certainly apply if NGBs and IFs are
seen as parts of a single judicial system, rather than separate systems. The single
system concept can be supported by the existence of an agency relationship
between NGBs and IFs. The NGBs are applying and following IFs rules, including
substantive rules.
184. See Sandstrome v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 511 (1979).
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more discovery and would be required to turn over all exculpatory
evidence. 5 Fourth, arbitration hearings would have to employ
many of the rules of evidence adopted by the federal courts.'86
F. Efficiency of the System
Is the Olympic Movement's doping control process reasonably
efficient? Does it work better than the alternative of the courts?
The answers to these questions turn on whether the doping control
process is (1) cost effective,(2) quick, (3) predictable, and (4)
whether it renders quality decisions and adequate remedies. If the
process were a true arbitration process, we would also ask whether
the system was private and flexible. However, in a true arbitration
system, the parties voluntarily agree to arbitrate the dispute, agree
on the arbitrator, and agree on the rules to govern the arbitration.
In the Olympic movement's doping control process, the dispute
settlement system, the decision maker, and rules are imposed on
the athlete.
Theoretically, the cost of the Olympic Movement's doping
control process should be less expensive than the judicial system for
the accused athlete. But it could be more expensive for the NGBs,
IFs, and the IOC. When the Olympic Movement constructs its own
dispute settlement system, it must pay the expense of the entire
infrastructure: the training, expenses, and salaries of the
arbitrators; the cost of the physical facilities and the administrative
cost of the system. In addition to these infrastructure costs, the
Olympic Movement must also pay the cost of prosecuting its case.
For the accused athlete, the theoretically streamlined system, when
compared to the judicial process, should demand less time and
therefore be less expensive. But this is illusory. The athlete will
still hire counsel, pay an investigator, bear the expense of expert
witnesses, and incur the cost of travel to distant locations for the
hearing. In all, it cannot be conclusively said that the Olympic
Movement's doping control process is less expensive than the
courts.
The Olympic Movement's doping control process will
generally be quicker than the courts. The rules of many NGBs and
IFs include time limits and provisions for expedited proceedings.
The CAS Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Sydney Olympic Games did an
185. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1987).
186. Arbitral bodies would have to adopt those rules of evidence deemed
necessary for fundamental fairness and to maintain the reasonable doubt standard.
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excellent job of quickly deciding cases during the Games. The
Doping Control process will only stretch out longer than a
comparable court proceeding when the system breaks down and the
rules are not followed.
The third criterion for an efficient dispute settlement system is
predictability of the outcome. This has been a problem for the
Olympic Movement's doping control system. Similar to the concept
of transparency, the results of a dispute settlement system must be
predictable and consistent in order to create efficiency and give the
system legitimacy. The system becomes efficient when parties can
consult precedent or doctrine to predict the outcome of a case with
a firm degree of certainty and, as a result, settle or abandon a case
in its early stages. Of course, consistently bad decisions will not
enhance legitimacy;
The Olympic Movement's doping control process has suffered
from unpredictability and inconsistency. Outcomes have often
been unpredictable because of a lack of precedent, a lack of
detailed procedural rules and because of the tension between the
NGBs and IFs.1" It is nearly impossible to learn about past
decisions of an NGB and IF, let alone the reasoning behind those
decisions. Some IFs do not even require the hearing panel to
explain its decision. Finally, the high number of times that an
NGB's decision has been reversed by an IF has created
unpredictability at best, and cynicism at the worst. 188
The fourth criterion, quality decisions, cannot be measured by
who wins-it must be measured by the professionalism and
impartiality of the process. The hallmarks of a quality process that
produces quality decisions include the following elements:
reasoned decisions based upon the evidence, a chance to present a
full defense and unbiased decision makers. The Olympic
Movement's doping control process has not always possessed these
elements. Too often the decision makers in the process have had
ties to the governing bodies appearing that are before them or have
had the appearance of ties to the governing bodies that are
appearing before them, thus creating the appearance of a biased
187. See Mark Levinstein, Speech at the Valparaiso University School of Law
Conference, A Critique of Sports Arbitration from the Athlete's Perspective,:
Arbitrating Sports Disputes: A World View (Nov. 2, 2000).
188. The reversal of NGB decisions creates unpredictability in the sense that
NGB precedent is unreliable. However, if the IF decisions rely upon a common
principle and are themselves consistent, then it can be argued that consistency and
predictability is being maintained. But, the almost 100% winning record for the
IF's position in IF conducted proceedings creates skepticism of the legitimacy and
fairness of the system.
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decision.1 89 Also, as has been noted earlier, the decisions have not
always been supported by an explanation, nor rendered after an
opportunity to present a full case." Therefore, it cannot be said
that the Olympic Movement's doping control process uniformly
renders quality decisions.
In summation, it cannot be said that the Olympic Movement's
doping control process is an efficient alternative dispute settlement
system. While some portions of the process have proven to be
efficient, most notably the CAS, as a whole, the doping control
process' dispute settlement system is expensive, unpredictable, and
often renders poor quality decisions. If this critique is correct, and
there is evidence that officials within the Olympic Movement have
reached the same conclusion,"' then why has the Olympic
Movement retained the system and only recently taken serious
steps to reform it? There must be a benefit to the Olympic
Movement in the system and the way that it operates. That benefit
is twofold. First, it keeps the Olympic Movement outside the
control and scrutiny of the courts of the member nations.
Alternative dispute systems can insulate parties from the dictates of
public policy protections. Second, the system allows the Olympic
Movement's governing bodies to remain in control and ensure their
advantage in dispute settlement. The IAAF's winning percentage
in IAAF conducted arbitrations is one that any Olympic athlete
would envy.
Therefore, the system is in need of repair. Fortunately, the
effort has begun with the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Now, the
question is whether those changes have been performance
enhancing.
189. Even the most neutral appearing tribunal in the Olympic Movement, the
Court for the Arbitration of Sport, receives much of its funding from the Olympic
Movement's governing bodies and uses arbitrators nominated by those same
governing bodies. But it must be noted that the decisions of CAS have shown a
strong streak of independence. See supra pp. 32-38.
190. Some NGBs and IFs limit the discovery rights of an athlete. With limited
discovery, an athlete is at a disadvantage when challenging the accuracy of test
results.
191. Drugs in Olympic Competition: Written Testimony Before the United States
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation. 106th Cong. 113




IV. Post Sydney Improvements
A. Impetus for Reform
As the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games approached, the
inadequacy of the Olympic Movement's doping control was
becoming more apparent. High profile cases, such as the Tour de
France and Michelle de Bruin were highlighting the flaws in the
system and threatening not only the public image of the Olympic
Movement, but also its financial stability. Sponsors and fans were
beginning to question the wisdom of spending money on Olympic
Movement events.
The effort to strengthen doping control began in earnest. The
IOC drafted the Anti-Doping Code to revise the substantive rules
of doping control and then created the World Anti-Doping Agency
to enforce the new rules of the Anti-Doping Code. Since the
United States was rocked by its own doping scandals, the USOC
created the United States Anti-Doping Agency and gave it the
responsibility of policing and adjudicating all doping control for all
United States NGBs. As these efforts to improve the Olympic
Movement's doping control near their two-year anniversary, the
time has come to ask whether they are working. Have they
improved the system?
B. International Olympic Committee Anti-Doping Code
According to Richard W. Pound, Vice President of the IOC,
the Anti-Doping Code's purpose is to create international
uniformity in the fight against doping in sport.1" This uniformity
means common testing procedures and common penalties for all
sports, for all countries, and for all athletes in the Olympic
Movement.193 Through this uniformity, the IOC hopes to create
efficiencies in the fight against doping and avoid inconsistencies in
the treatment of doping cases between different NGBs in the same
IF and between different IFs within the Olympic family. Also, to
assist the purpose of uniformity of treatment, the IOC sought to
protect athletes' rights, rights that might have been overlooked in
the past. As a corollary interest, the IOC hoped to increase the






However, while uniformity and efficiency may be the stated
purposes of the Anti-Doping Code, the unstated purpose may very
well be to improve public relations. Recent doping scandals
threaten the future of the Olympic Movement. The 1998 Tour de
France cycling scandal and individual cases such as Michelle de
Bruin, Dennis Michell, and Linford Christy, are threatening to
create the public image of an Olympic Movement awash in
performance-enhancing drugs. Such an image will seriously curtail
sponsorship and money to the Olympic Movement. Shortly after
the Tour de France scandal, many sponsors threatened to withdraw
support. Even though the IOC benefits from the public attention
created by drug produced world records, it would suffer even more
from the mass exodus of sponsors and viewers.
1. Key Provisions-The IOC's Anti-Doping Code, in one
sense, creates a singular, self-contained legal universe. It attempts
to create, for itself, the components fundamental to a criminal law
system. It speaks to substantive jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction,
sanctions, and procedural rules. It is an attempt to pre-empt
recourse to alternative systems.
2. Substantive Jurisdiction-The IOC's Anti-Doping Code
outlaws the use of any expedient substance or method that is
harmful to an athlete's health or is capable of enhancing an
athlete's performance.9  "Use" of a substance occurs when the
substance is found in an athlete's body, regardless of how it got
there. 6 Because this definition is broad, the Code contains, in an
annex, a list of prohibited substances and methods.1'9 That list is
divided into prohibited substances, prohibited methods, and
prohibited substances in certain circumstances. 8  Assisting an
athlete in procuring or using banned substances is forbidden as is
trafficking in prohibited substances."
The Code does not contain criteria for determining if or by
how much a substance must enhance performance. Further, the
Code prohibits an athlete from challenging the inclusion of a
substance or method on the prohibited list." Then, to further
expand the coverage of the Code, the Code states that the list is not
195. OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE ("IOC CODE") ch. II, art. 2.
(International Olympic Committee 2001), available at http://www.olympic.org/
UK/organization/commissions/medical/antidpoing-uk.asp (last modified May 28,
2000).
196. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. 1, art 1 and ch. IL, art. 2.
197. IOC CODE, supra note 197, app. A.
198. Id.
199. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. IL, art. 1(3).
200. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. III, art. 3.
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exhaustive: other substances could be prohibited under the term
"and related substances."20'
3. Personal Jurisdiction-The Code applies to all
"participants" who are preparing for the Olympic Games or
preparing for competitions organized by IFs or National Olympic
Committees that are members of the Olympic family. The term
"participant" is broadly defined to include not only athletes, but
also coaches and support personnel working with an athlete.203 So
defined, the Code's jurisdiction would appear to cover every athlete
that aspires to the Olympic Games. But this intent-based definition
will, in practice, be applied in the reverse. That is to say, any
athlete who refuses to accept or who runs afoul of the Code, will be
denied entry to the Olympic Games.
The IOC has chosen this method of defining personal
jurisdiction for two very practical reasons. First, the IOC only has
jurisdiction over the Olympic Games. It does not control other
competitions or athletic organizations, except by denying partic-
ipation in the Olympics. It therefore exercises control over athletes
by controlling entry to the most prized competition to the athlete.
Secondly, because the IOC does not have direct control over the
IFs that regulate individual sports, and some IFs have challenged
the IOC's power to regulate their athletes,' the IOC must make an
end run around the IFs directly to the athletes. The result is
personal jurisdiction over anyone who still holds a dream of
competing in the Olympics.
The Code's jurisdiction over coaches and support personnel
that traffic in prohibited substances or methods will likely be
achieved in two ways. First, like athletes, coaches that desire to be
credentialed to the Olympics must abide by the Code. Second,
coaches will be reached through the athletes that they work with.
Athletes who train under coaches who have been sanctioned will be
banned from the Olympics. As a result, dishonest coaches will
effectively be banned from the Olympic Games.
4. Sanctions-The penalties for using a prohibited substance
or method are separated into two categories apparently based on
the level of performance enhancement of the substance or method.
201. IOC CODE, supra note 197, app. A.
202. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. I, art. 1.
203. Id.
204. Doping Summit Seems Hard to Meet Goals, XINHAU NEWS AGENCY,
Feb.3, 1999, available at http://www.xinhau.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); Helen




Then, the penalty for each category is increased upon a showing of
intent or culpability. Finally, the harshest penalty, a lifetime ban, is
imposed for trafficking in prohibited substances and methods.
The first category of penalties, applied to substances with
short-term performance enhancement effect, includes a fine and a
suspension from one to six months. 20° Apparently, this penalty is
imposed for inadvertent or unknowing use of the substances. The
second category of penalties is reserved for the use of substances
and methods that enhance performance for prolonged periods of
time or, by the nature of their use, show a design to enhance
performance. °' The deliberate performance enhancement aspect of
the second category causes the penalty to be increased to a two-
year suspension and fine of up to $100,000. However, when
"exceptional circumstances" exist, the appropriate IF may modify
the two-year suspension.2w
Next, upon a showing of intentional doping or efforts to
conceal the use of prohibited substances and methods, the penalties
for each category are dramatically increased. 2' For the category of
short-term performance enhancing substances, the penalty is
increased to a suspension of two to eight years.209 For the second
category, use of long-term performance enhancing substances and
methods, or a second offense of using the first category of
substances, penalties are increased to a fine of up to $1,000,000 and
a suspension of four years to life.2" Finally, in all cases of doping
during a competition, all medals and prizes are forfeited. "
5. Procedural Rules-The Code contains only a broad
outline concerning disciplinary hearings and the procedural rules
that would apply. These general guidelines will likely need
elaboration by case law in order to provide more specific guidance.
Disciplinary hearings are to be conducted first by NGBs, the
IOC and IFs.2 Appeals from IF decisions must be taken to the
CAS.213 However, it is uncertain and will likely be left to CAS
common law whether an appeal may be taken from an NGB
205. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. II, art. 3(1)(a).
206. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
207. Id.
208. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. II, art. 3(2).
209. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. II, art. 3(2).
210. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. 1I, art. 3(2)(b).
211. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. II, art. 3(3).
212. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. III, art. 1.
213. All members of the Olympic Movement must accept the jurisdiction of the
CAS. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. III, art. 1 and 6.
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decision directly to the CAS, bypassing the IF, and whether a CAS
hearing will be conducted de novo.2 14
At the initial hearing, the Code creates several important
presumptions and burdens. To begin, tests conducted by a certified
laboratory are presumed accurate; therefore, the athlete has the
burden of impeaching the results. "' Secondly, an athlete may not
challenge the inclusion of a substance or method on the banned list,
nor may the athlete argue that the substance or method failed to
enhance his performance.216 Finally, consistent with the intent of
the Code to punish intentional doping more severely than
inadvertent doping, intentional doping may be proven by
presumptions.217 However, the particulars of such presumptions are
not delineated in the Code and presumably will be left to the IFs
and case law to develop.
6. Policing-The JOC's fight against doping and
enforcement of the Anti-Doping Code is the job of the World Anti-
Doping Agency ("WADA").218 Envisioned as an international
super-cop, WADA's structure and specific tasks are yet to be
developed. The Anti-Doping Code, in addition to calling for the
creation of WADA, assigns only two specific tasks: the
accreditation of laboratories and the recommendation of changes in
the list of prohibited substances and methods.219 All other tasks of
WADA are left to the will of its founders and constituents.
WADA came into existence on November 10, 1999.20 WADA
is governed by a thirty-two member Board consisting of represent-
atives from the 1OC, IFs, NOC, and Governments. The Vice
President of the IOC governs the Board.22' The IOC has given
WADA twenty-five million dollars in start-up funds and WADA's
goal was to be fully functioning by the Sydney Olympics. 222 At
214. The new procedures of the United States Anti-Doping Agency create just
such an appeal that bypasses the IF. See USADA PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING § 9(b)(iv), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files
/USADA_- Protocol.pdf.
215. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. III, art. 2.
216. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. III, art. 3; IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch.
II, art. 4(4).
217. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. II, art. 4(1).
218. IOC CODE, supra note 197, ch. IV, art. 4(1).
219. Id.
220. Janet Heinonen, KEEPING TRACK, Dec. 1999, Issue No. 92.
221. Janet Heinonen, KEEPING TRACK, Jan. 2000, Issue No. 93




Sydney, WADA supervised all doping control; however, on a
worldwide basis, WADA expects to only supplement IF testing.2
C. The United States Anti-Doping Agency
1. Origin and Purpose-The United States Anti-Doping
Agency ("USADA") is a private, not-for-profit corporation that
was created and then hired by the USOC to police, test, and
prosecute Olympic Movement athletes for the use of performance
enhancing and illegal drugs. 24 According to official publications,
the USOC created the USADA to "enhance the international
credibility of the United States' anti-doping efforts by eliminating
the negative perceptions inherent in the existing self-regulated
program.""22  Before USADA's birth on October 1, 2000, the
USOC and a number of the United States NGBs had been accused
of cover-ups and conflicts of interest in their doping control
efforts.226 Led by its Chairman, Frank Shorter, the USADA has
created an infrastructure of testing and adjudicatory machinery that
is replacing the USOC and NGBs roles in policing doping among
American Olympic hopefuls.227
2. Relationship With United States Olympic Committee,
National Governing Bodies, International Federations, International
Olympic Committee, and World Anti-Doping Agency-With the
creation of USADA came a significant realignment of duties and
relationships between the bureaucracies that govern Olympic sports
in the United States and beyond. Prior to the creation of USADA,
anti-doping policing responsibilities were split between the NGBs
and USOC within the United States, and between the IFs and IOC
on the international level. 228  Now, the USADA will be solely
responsible for policing domestic events and athletes within the
boundaries of the United States. 29 IFs will presumably remain
223. See supra note 193.
224. U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, UNITED STATES ANTi-DOPING AGENCY
PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING § 1 (2001), http://www.
usantidoping.org/files/USADA-Protocol.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
225. U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY FACT
SHEET 1 (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
226. See Linda Fantin, U.S. Track Officials Want Probe in Doping Controversy,
THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 28, 2000 at A5; see also Owen Slot, U.S. Athletes
Facing Ban over Drug Testing, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 1, 2001, at 3.
227. See U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
FACT SHEET 1-3 (2001) , http://www.usantidoping.org/ files/Press Release_3 22
200125.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
228. See supra notes 59-65.
229. U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
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responsible for policing United States athletes competing outside
the United States and for IF-sponsored events staged within the
United States. The IOC will continue to police the Olympic
Games. However, the role that the IFs play in prosecuting United
States athletes caught by USADA testing will be greatly reduced or
eliminated.
The realignment of doping control responsibility begins with
the relatively recent amendment to the USOC Bylaws. In Bylaw
chapter 23, section 2, paragraph G, the USOC conditions recogni-
tion of an NGB upon the acceptance by the NGB of USADA as
the sole anti-doping police authority.230 The USOC can wield such
control because, under the ASA, an NGB must be recognized by
the USOC before it can operate within the Olympic Movement."3
The result is that all United States NGB's doping control and
adjudication systems have been scrapped and replaced with
USADA's system. Therefore, all NGBs and the USOC are out of
the business of doping control and enforcement. The NGBs will
still be involved in designating athletes for out-of-competition
testing, but USADA will also choose which athletes will be tested.
Under the pre-USADA system, IFs frequently intervened or
played an appellate role in NGB anti-doping actions. If an IF is
unhappy with the result of an NGB proceeding, the IF could take
the case to its own adjudication process, often resulting in a reversal
of the NGB decision.232 Additionally, an athlete who is unhappy
with an NGB decision could appeal to the IF. With the USADA
system, the IF's review and appellate role has been replaced by an
appeal to the CAS. 3 According to USADA's rules, the athlete and
the IF are parties to the process and may appeal the initial
arbitration decision to the CAS.2' 4 Further, the CAS result is
declared final and binding.35 Whether IFs will accept CAS
decisions as final is yet to be seen.236
PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING § 2 (2001), http://www.
usantidoping.org/files/USADA-Protocol.pdf (Mar. 29, 2002).
230. U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., BYLAWS, ch. 23, § 2(G) (2001), available at
http://www.usolympicteam.com/about-us/documents/bylawsl02701.pdf (Oct. 27,
2001).
231. 36 U.S.C. § 220521(a) (Supp. 2001).
232. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (discussing reversal of NGB
decisions by Ifs).
233. U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING § 9(b)(iii) (2001), http:/lwww.
usantidoping.org/files/USADA-Protocol.pdf (Dec. 1, 2001).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. It was only with great reluctance that the IAAF, in the summer of 2001,
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During the testing and adjudication process, USADA will use
the protocols of the IOC and the IFs list of banned drugs.237 Should
a gap in the IOC's procedures or the IF's list become important,
USADA will look to the IOC's Anti-Doping Code.2 ' Therefore,
presumably the anti-doping policies of the IFs will be achieved.
Questions remain, however, over the legal and practical status
of USADA in relation to the other governing bodies. As a not-for-
profit corporation, USADA appears to be an independent
contractor free to perform its responsibilities as it sees fit.
However, because it has been assigned specific tasks with a set of
preexisting guidelines, USADA may be stepping into an agency
relationship with the USOC and even the NGBs and IFs. As an
agent, USADA is subject to both the responsibilities and the
controls applicable to the USOC and NGBs. Those responsibilities
and controls would include the ASA, the Constitution of the IOC,
and the Rules of the applicable IF. Although USADA may claim
functional independence from these organizations, it may not be
deemed legally independent.
3. Who is Tested and When are They Tested?-Because
USADA has become the testing agent for the USOC and all
United States NGBs, those athletes who were subject to testing
before USADA will continue to be tested by USADA.2 19  But,
USADA, in its effort to enhance the image of United States testing
credibility, will expand the numbers, if not the categories, of those
that it tests.
Those athletes who will continue to be tested as they were
before the USADA include members of the United States Olympic
team and members of other international teams. Those eligible for
testing continue to include those participating in USOC and NGB
sanctioned events, particularly the Olympic Trials and national
championships, and all NGB members. Now that USADA is in
control of testing, more athletes will be tested more frequently.2 °
Although USADA will continue to use the appropriate NGB
and IF rules for selecting those to be tested at a particular
accepted the appellate role of CAS. IAFF Disputes Will Now Be Referred to CAS,
IAFF http://www.iaff.org/News?newsletter?News%2020.pdf (Aug. 10, 2001).
237. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, United States Anti-Doping Agency Protocol
for Olympic Movement Testing § 9(b)(v) (2001), http://www.usantidoping
.org/files/USADAProtocol.pdf (Dec. 1, 2001).
238. Id.
239. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, United States Anti-Doping Agency Protocol
for Olympic Movement Testing § 4 (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/




competition and out-of-competition, USADA will use its own
judgment to add to those lists. 2 1 Particularly, to enhance deter-
rence, USADA will test significantly more athletes and even
establish numerical targets. 4 2 Out-of-competition testing will be a
special focus of USADA.243
An interesting question about this expanded testing effort is
whether it will include professional league athletes such as those
from the National Basketball Association and Major League
Soccer. Professional league athletes are eligible to represent the
United States in the Olympics and world championships but they
are often not members of the NGBs, do not participate in NGB and
USOC-sanctioned events until being selected to United States
teams, and likely have not contacted USADA to consent to testing.
Therefore, considering that professional league athletes could be
named to international and Olympic teams, are they subject to out-
of-competition testing before being named a team member?
A restrictive reading of the USADA's Protocol for Olympic
Movement Testing does not include professional league athletes
unless they would fit under the category of "athletes who are
participating or have the potential to participate, in international
competition. ' '24  This definition does include professional league
athletes, but it is a reach. However, if USADA is serious about its
vow to increase the credibility of testing in the United States, it will
have to test professional league athletes. Additionally, as an agent
for the USOC, and in some cases as an agent for the IOC and IFs,
USADA will be applying the IOC's Anti-Doping Code, which does
assert jurisdiction over any athlete with the potential of
participating in the Olympics.
25
4. Testing Scope and Procedure-As the universal doping
cop for all Olympic sports, USADA follows the lead of the IOC,
but defers to IFs in individual cases. USADA uses only JOC
accredited laboratories and IOC established laboratory standards.246
241. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
242. Dick Patrick, Drug Czar Will Push for Testing Plan at Hearing, USA
TODAY, Oct. 20, 1999, at 18C. USADA hopes to conduct 6000-8000 tests annually.
Id.
243. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING § 2 (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA
_Protocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
244. Id.
245. See supra text at IV.B.3.
246. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING §§ 6-7 (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA
_Protocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
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Also, in advising athletes and in its Guide to Prohibited Classes of
Substances and Prohibited Methods of Doping, USADA follows the
IOC Anti-Doping Code. 247 However, when assessing a violation,
USADA will use the prohibited list of the applicable IF.
5. Adjudication-After both the "A sample" and "B
sample" have produced a positive result, the adjudication process,
or what USADA euphemistically calls the "results management"
process, is triggered. It is here that USADA has introduced an
innovative two step process of review by a Review Board and then
an arbitration process. Similar to a preliminary hearing for
determining probable cause in a criminal case, the Review Board
determines if sufficient evidence of a doping violation exists. If
sufficient evidence does exist and USADA decides to prosecute,
the second step is arbitration.
a. Review Board-Like the system that existed before
the creation of USADA, two samples are taken from an athlete, an
"A sample" and a "B sample." The A sample is tested and only
upon a positive result is the B sample tested.4 9 Also, the athlete is
notified of the A sample's positive result, the pending test of the B
sample, and his or her right to be present with a witness at the
testing of the B sample."' However, from that point on, USADA's
rules have dramatically changed the process. Now, USADA's rules
give the suspected athlete access to important documents and
provides a preliminary hearing step.
After the A sample has been tested, and before the B sample is
tested, the athlete is given the laboratory documents from the A
sample testing process.2 ' These documents could prove valuable to
the athlete in preparing to witness the B sample testing. Then, after
the B sample has been tested and before any further proceedings,
the laboratory documents from the B sample testing are given to
the athlete.252
If the B sample confirms the A sample's positive result,
USADA's Anti-Doping Review Board springs into action. The
Review Board is a panel of three to five independent experts, who
review the test results to determine whether there is sufficient
247. USADA Guide to Prohibited Classes of Substances and Prohibited
Methods of Doping, http://www.usantidoping.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
248. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING § 3(c) (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA
_Protocol.pdf.
249. Id. § 8(b).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. § 8(c).
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evidence of doping to justify a hearing."3  USADA's Chief
Executive Officer draws the Board's members from a list of
medical, technical, and legal experts appointed by USADA Board
of Directors for two-year terms.5 4 Each Review Board is to have
one medical expert, one technical expert, and one legal expert in
the field of doping matters.2 5'
According to USADA, the process before a Review Board is
not a hearing." Therefore, no oral proceedings or pleading may
take place.257  Rather, only documentary submissions are per-
mitted. 8  USADA will supply the Board with the laboratory
documents and any other relevant documents259 and after receiving
the same documents given by USADA to the Board, the athlete is
permitted to submit written material.2' No one may appear before
the Board.26'
After reviewing the written submissions, which the Board may
supplement at its own request,262 a majority vote is taken.6  The
results of that vote are reported to USADA, the athlete, the
applicable IF, the applicable NGB, and WADA.264  If the vote
concluded that sufficient evidence of doping exists, USADA may
charge the athlete with a doping violation and a hearing will be
held.265 At this stage, USADA appears to have the discretion not to
accuse the athlete of a doping violation, even if the Board
concluded that sufficient evidence exists.26
b. Hearing and Appeals Process-If USADA chooses to
prosecute an athlete after receiving a recommendation from the
Review Board, USADA must notify the athlete of the specific
charges and accompanying sanctions.267 If the athlete wishes to
contest the sanction,26 he or she has ten days to request a hearing.269
253. Id. § 9(a).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 9(a)(i)(5).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. § 9(a)(i)(3).
260. Id. § 9(a)(i)(2).
261. Id. § 9(a)(i)(5).
262. Id. § 9(a)(i)(4).
263. Id. § 9(a)(i)(6).
264. Id. § 9(a)(i)(7).
265. Id. § 9(b)(i).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Within the text of USADA Protocol, § 9(b)(i), the phrasing "to contest the
sanction sought by USADA" suggests that the strict liability doctrine is in full
force within USADA. The athlete may not contest his guilt, only the sanction
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That request will set in motion an arbitration process quite singular
and different from the process that existed prior to USADA: a
process that has taken NGBs completely out of the role as
prosecutor and judge and similarly removed the IFs from sitting as
judge on doping violations.
USADA has attempted to fashion an independent arbitration
system outside of the control of the sports governing bodies that
begins with a trial-type proceeding before the AAA and permits an
appeal to the CAS. The initial hearing is before a single arbitrator,
or panel of three if requested by any party to the hearing, drawn
from a list of AAA arbitrators who are also members of the CAS.27
The AAA Commercial Arbitration rules, as amended by USADA,
govern the procedure of the hearing."' The NGB plays no part in
the hearing, being replaced as the prosecutor by USADA. Further,
and presumptively designed to preempt the IF hearing process,7.
the applicable IF is either made a party to the hearing or invited to
observe the proceedings. 3
Following the arbitration decision, the athlete or the IF, but
presumably not USADA,274 may appeal to the CAS.275 The CAS
hearing will take place in the United States under the CAS
appellate rules. 6 CAS's decision will be final and binding on all
imposed under the strict liability doctrine. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING
AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING § 9(b)(i) (2001),
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA Protocol.pdf.
269. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING § 9(b) (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA
_Protocol.pdf.
270. Id. § 9(b)(ii).
271. Id.
272. As a party to the hearing, an IF could be barred from using its own
arbitration-sanctioned system against the athlete or the relevant NGB under the
theories of res judicata or consent. This result is vital to the legitimacy of and
effectiveness of the USADA system. Should an IF be able to again prosecute an
athlete after the USADA system has done so, USADA will become an adversary
of the IFs and not the independent actor intended.
273. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING § 9(b)(ii) (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA
_Protocol.pdf.
274. USADA is not listed as a party entitled to appeal to the CAS in § 9(b)iii.
275. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC





parties277 and thus would preclude any IF proceeding. Additionally,
at the athlete's discretion, the AAA hearing may be bypassed in
favor of a single hearing before CAS.278
The applicable IF's list of prohibited substances and sanctions
applies to the process.279 However, should there be a gap in the IF's
rules, the IOC Anti-Doping Code will be used.2 ° Interestingly,
both panels may use principles developed in CAS case decisions to
mitigate the rules of the IF or Anti-Doping Code.281 Nevertheless,
custody and testing procedures, when performed by an IOC
accredited laboratory, are presumed to satisfy prevailing practice.2"
To overcome this presumption, the athlete must show more than
minor irregularities. 3 If the presumption is rebutted, the burden
shifts to USADA to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
custody of the sample and testing procedure met required
standards.2
From start to finish, each hearing must be completed within
three months.8 ' A shortened period may be used when protected
competitions are pending.2 6 The panel must issue a reasoned
decision,"' presumably written and public. The results will be
communicated to the athlete, the USADA, the USOC, the applic-
able NGB and IF, and WADA.2 Sanctions may only be imposed
after the first hearing has been concluded 9 and the results made
public.
277. Id.
278. Id. § 9(b)(iv).
279. Id. § 9(b)(v).
280. Id.
281. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Procedures for
Arbitration initiated by the USADA, Rule 33(e), at http://www.adr.org/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002), ("AAA Supplementary Procedures").
282. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC




285. AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 281, at Rule 24.
286. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING § 12 (2001), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/USADA
_Protocol.pdf.
287. AAA Supplementary Procedures, supra note 281, at Rule 44.
288. See UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC





D. Enhancing Efficiency, Speed and Predictability
Have the Anti-Doping Code, WADA, and USADA improved
the efficiency of the Olympic Movement's dispute settlement
system? Considering the disarray of the pre-Sydney system, the
short answer has to be yes.
The Anti-Doping Code, if it unifies and clarifies the
substantive rules of the system, will save time and money. WADA
is a new bureaucracy, in some respects replacing the doping control
bureaucracy of the IFs, and like any bureaucracy, will require
significant funding. Therefore, WADA could save the IFs money
and create efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort between IFs.
But the proposed expansion of out-of-competition testing will drive
up the cost of WADA's activity. USADA, like WADA, will save
United States NGBs money by taking over doping control and
creating efficiencies of specialization. USADA's use of the AAA
and CAS, in the place of NGB hearing systems and IF arbitrations,
will also save money. However, USADA's more aggressive testing
plans and permanent bureaucracy will likely increase costs.
Consequently, the costs will only be shifted and reallocated rather
than reduced.
The speed of the process will undoubtedly be improved by
USADA. The Code and WADA will likely have no effect on the
speed of the system. USADA's strict time limits, three months in
the case of the AAA hearing,2" and its use of CAS in the place of
IF appeals will speed the process considerably.
The Doping control process should become more predictable.
The Anti-Doping Code should promote uniformity among all the
sports. Greater use of CAS, called for by both the Anti-Doping
Code and USADA, will result in more published decisions, the
development of doctrine, and the influence of precedent.
USADA's use of the AAA and requirement of written and
reasoned decisions will also improve predictability.
The quality of decisions should be improved if the Anti-
Doping Code reduces the vagueness and discretion found in some
IF's rules and if WADA brings more professionalism to the testing
and laboratory supervision processes. As for the bias of the
decision makers, USADA, by using AAA and CAS arbitrators,
should remove much of the appearance of bias and control by the
governing bodies. However, USADA retains a number of ties to
290. See supra note 285.
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the USOC and United States NGBs through its funding and
personnel. Finally, USADA's hearing procedures should afford
athletes a fuller chance to present their case. But, the probable
cause determination, rendered by the Review Board by not
allowing an oral presentation, remains problematic.
In summation, the Anti-Doping Code, WADA, and USADA
will improve the efficiency of the Olympic Movement's doping
control process. Unfortunately, the improvement will not be
uniform. The process within the United States, when USADA
conducts the testing, will be much improved. When the testing is
done outside of the United States, regardless of the citizenship of
the athlete, the process will continue to be inefficient and lacking in
due process.
E. International Organizations Should Follow USADA's Lead
After running a personal best in 3000 meters at a Global
League meet in Paris, Olga Yegorova's blood showed signs of the
banned substance erythropoietin ("EPO"). 9' Before the equivalent
of B-sample had been tested,29 the results of her blood test were
released to the press by the French meet organizers. The IAAF
suspended Yegorova while the results of her B-sample test were
pending.293 With Olga's 5000 race in the World Championships only
a week off, the IAAF announced that its laboratory in Lausanne
had botched the urine test and that a new test would have to be
conducted. That error put off the test results for three days. In the
meantime, one of Olga's competitors publicly announced that she
would boycott the race if Olga was allowed to compete.29' The
IRISH TIMES labeled, Olga as a drug cheat.9
Guilty or not guilty, Olga Yegorova was denied due process,
punished, and subjected to withering attacks from the press and her
291. EPO increase the body's production of red blood cells and thereby the
athlete's ability to perform in endurance events. Griwkowski, EDMONTON SUN,
Aug. 2, 2001, available at http://www.fyiedmonton.com/htdocs/edmsun.shtml (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002).
292. The EPO testing protocol requires both a blood test and a urine test. If
the blood test shows an elevated red blood cell count, it must be confirmed by a
urine test.
293. Dick Patrick, IOC's Most Trying Test: Drugs Controversy Flares Again at
Opening of World Track Championships, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2001, at 3C.
294. Szabo Threatens Pull-Out in Doping Row, THE IRISH TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001,
available at http://www.Ireland.com/sports/athletics/2001/0801/athletics2.htm (last




competitors. In addition to being suspended before any type of
hearing could be held, she was suspended before the testing process
had even been completed. She was the object of scorn and moral
condemnation.296
Olga Yegorova's case is the latest, and in some ways a very
telling, example of a system that treats accused athletes as criminals
without affording them even basic procedural protections.
Although it may seem extreme to call this a criminal process, if we
examine the accusations being leveled against the athlete, the
penalties being imposed, and the indicia of the system, we see that
it is very much like a criminal system. To begin, the athlete is being
accused of an act of moral turpitude: cheating by intentionally
taking illegal substances. These acts are malum in se. Then, as
punishment, the athlete is prohibited from earning a living at his
chosen profession and, in a sense, being placed on probation. The
athlete cannot associate with former co-workers,' and must pass
additional tests to return to work. Also, the athlete can face a
monetary fine for wrongdoing.298 Finally, the system uses terms and
concepts such as "intentional '' 299 and "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."'  These punishments are in addition to public embarrass-
ment, scorn and suspicion from one's peers.
As a criminal system, an athlete should be afforded the
protections of the criminal process. The burden of proof should
always rest with the sports governing body. The athlete should be
given a full and fair hearing, including full discovery, before being
punished. And the punishment should fit the crime. If athletes are
not afforded the protections of the criminal system, the stability,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of the doping control process will
always be in jeopardy. If the system wrongfully punishes or harshly
treats athletes it will lose the support of those it governs, perhaps
lose the support of the ticket buying public, and spark a return to
296. Ironically, the IAAF reversed its suspension when the test was thrown out
due to testing protocol problems. Philip Hersh, Runner's Threat Called
'Blackmail" CHI. TRIB., AUG. 5, 2001, § 3, at 11. Later, the French Meet
Organizers were forced to drop their claim against Olga because of testing
procedure flaws.
297. Pursuant to the contamination rule, an athlete found guilty of doping
violations cannot associate with former co-workers.
298. See OLYMPIC MOVEMENT ANTI-DOPING CODE ch. II, art. 3(1)(a)(iii) and
art. 3(2)(b)(ii), available at http://www.GNOC.com/code.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2002).
299. Id. ch. II, art. 3(2)(a).
300. See IAAF CONST. Rule 59(6), available at http://www.IAAF.org (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002).
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the days of shamateurism3 1 and athlete's battles with the AAU.
The best way to eliminate drugs is to build a thorough testing
system that is fair and operates with a high level of integrity.
V. Conclusion
Currently, considering the post Sydney changes, the system
created by USADA is far superior to the international system.
Though not perfect, USADA's system of a preliminary hearing,
fairly neutral arbitrators, and no pre-hearing suspension is far
better than the rather draconian and disorganized system admin-
istered by the IFs outside the United States. Although this
assessment might simply point to the difference between an
inquisitorial system and adversarial system,3° the cases of Diane
Modahl, °3 Katrin Krabbe,3 O and now Olga Yegorova stand as
counter evidence. The International Olympic Movement would do
well to copy and learn from USADA. If the international system
does not provide greater safeguards and protections for athletes,
and if the international system does not become more organized
and professional, it could face more challenges. The British
Athletic Association, the German Athletic System, and the
Australian Athletic Association have already recently challenged
the system." The challenges could move from within the Olympic
Movement to the political arena and courtrooms. Although Mary
301. The term refers to the gap in the former rules that allowed "amature"
athletes to get paid under the table.
302. The procedures and rules of a large number of International Federations
appear to reflect the civil law systems of the countries in which they are located.
These civil law based rules are often at odds with the common law based
expectations of athletes from common law countries. This conflict would be most
dramatic as it concerns the presumptions of innocent and burdens of proof.
303. Diane Modahl, the 1990 Commonwealth 800 meter championship from the
United Kingdom, tested positive for drugs in 1994 and was suspended for four
years by the British Athletic Federation. In 1995, an independent appeal panel
cleared her. She has since filed a claim of £ 100 million to recover lost earnings
and legal costs. Vivek Chaudhary, Modahl Robbed of Her Best Years, THE
GUARDIAN, July 26, 2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/
Article/0,4273,4228306,00.html (last visited Feb, 24, 2002).
304. Katrin Krabbe, the 1991 World Championship 100 and 200 meter
champion for Germany was suspended for one year in 1992 by the German
Athletic Federation after she was admitted taking clenbuterol in an asthma
medicine. In 1993 the IAAF added another two years to her suspension as a
penalty for "unsportsman-like conduct." In 1996 a Munich court ruled that the
IAAF had no right to extend Krabbe's suspension beyond the first year. In 2001
the court awarded her $1.2 DM in compensation.




Slaney's court challenge fell on a jurisdictional technicality, that
flaw could be avoided in a similar future case.3°' Additionally, a
reasonable argument can be made that WADA's actions are
subject to public international law, including the dictates of
procedural fairness.37  A breach of those dictates could void
WADA actions or render it subject to damages-particularly in a
United States court under the Alien Tort Statute.""
But this is not to say that USADA's system is free from faults.
The results of the test of the "A sample" and "B sample" should
not be turned over to the IFs until a hearing has been held. The IFs
cannot be trusted to protect an athlete's reputation before the
process has undergone the scrutiny of an adversarial hearing. Olga
Yegorova's case is an example of this risk. Then, the preliminary
process before the Review Board must be opened up to oral
presentations by the athlete and the cross examination of adverse
witnesses must be allowed. As currently structured, without
transparency and the opportunity to test the evidence, the Review
Board process could become merely a rubber stamp for the lab
results. Before the matter goes public, the adversarial process must
have a chance to work.
Additionally, athletes must be provided the right to challenge
the inclusion of a drug on the banned list, including the scientific
reliability of any presumptions. Medical science is not infallible,
306. The court in Slaney found that the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 201, barred
judicial scrutiny of the IAAF arbitration decision. However, because the
convention's coverage is limited to the arbitration of commercial disputes, an
argument that doping control arbitrations are not fundamentally commercial in
nature, could render the convention inapplicable.
307. The argument that WADA is an international organization with
international personality and thereby subject to the dictates of customary
international law would proceed in three steps. First, WADA is an international
organization capable of possessing international personality because it possesses
the attributes of an organization (a headquarters, a staff, and a budget that has
been delegated and performs sovereign acts (state members, state funds,
regulation of drugs). See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 221 (1987); PIETER BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, 54-56 (Montinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1987). Second, such an Intergovernmental Organization possesses that degree of
international personality (rights and duties) necessary to carry out the functions
delegated to it. See REPARATIONS FOR INJURIES SUFFERED IN THE SERVICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, ILJ Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.L.J. 174. Third customary
international law dictates that, when a state or organization exercises jurisdiction,
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before enforcement must be afforded
a defendant. See UNITED STATES RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 431(3)
(1987).
308. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
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and the application of generalities to individual athletes may not be
justified in exceptional cases.3' Finally, punishment must be
flexible. If an athlete did not intend to consume a banned
substance, the punishment should be mitigated accordingly. If the
evidence shows an absence of intent, the suspension should be
lifted when the performance enhancing qualify of the substance has
dissipated. The option would have allowed the Olympic Movement
to deal fairly with the rash of nandrolone-positive tests that were
tied to tainted dietary supplements.
310
309. This is one of the improvements that would have cleaned up the mess that
was Mary Slaney's case. See supra text at I.A..
310. This is one of the improvements that would have produced a fair outcome
of the Nandralone Four's case. See supra text at I.B.
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